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Executive summary 
 
The UK Government is currently reviewing the fourth carbon budget for the period 
2023-27.  
 
The Committee on Climate Change has recommended that the budget, which was 
originally legislated in 2011, should remain unchanged. That is, the UK should plan to cut 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 50 per cent, relative to 1990 levels, by 2025 — the 
midpoint of the fourth carbon budget period. 
 
The fourth carbon budget has been criticised for committing the UK to a unilateral, and 
potentially economically damaging, emissions reductions pathway, the ambition of 
which is not shared by its international competitors (EEF, 2013). This paper explores 
whether this concern is well founded.  
 
We find that the UK is a global leader on climate change policy action. However, the UK 
is not alone. Rather, it is part of a leading group of nations which are taking policy action 
on climate change. Also in this group are many of the UK’s major trading partners, 
including France, Germany, Norway, Korea, Mexico and China. Furthermore, there is no 
major economic power that has not taken steps to combat climate change — although 
taken together they fall short of the global commitment to stabilise climate change at no 
more than 2oC of average warming.   
 
We reach these conclusions by comparing the UK with its competitors on three 
indicators of climate change policy action: the presence of national greenhouse gas 
emissions targets, the adoption of climate change legislation and the resulting implicit or 
explicit price of carbon. For the purposes of this paper, we define the UK’s ‘competitors’ 
as the Member States of the European Union (EU), other developed countries and major 
emerging (and high-emitting) countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico,  South 
Africa, South Korea and Turkey. 
 
National greenhouse gas emissions targets   
A comparison of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets with its 
competitors’ shows that:  
 All but one (Turkey) of the UK’s main trading partners and competitors have 
quantified greenhouse gas emissions reduction or limitation targets.  
 
 The UK’s fourth carbon budget appears consistent with the ambitions of the 
European Union. The European Commission and Parliament propose to reduce EU-
wide carbon emissions by at least 40 per cent by 2030, relative to 1990 levels. 
Previous EU greenhouse gas targets have been met by allocating individual targets to 
Member States based on effort-sharing according to the general principle that the 
richest countries per capita should reduce their emissions fastest. The European 
Council will consider this proposal this spring.  
 
 China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, has a firm commitment to 
reduce its carbon intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 40-45 per cent by 2020, 
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relative to 2005. Comparing like with like, this is slightly more ambitious than the UK 
target, which translates into a reduction in carbon intensity of 39 per cent by 2020.   
 
 A number of countries have already committed themselves to carbon neutrality: the 
Maldives by 2020; Costa Rica by 2021; Norway by 2030; and Sweden by 2050. 
Iceland and New Zealand have also committed to move towards carbon neutrality, 
without a firm date.   
 
 Some industrialised countries outside Europe have short to medium-term carbon 
reductions targets that are less ambitious than the UK’s. For example, the United 
States has committed to a 17 per cent reduction in carbon emissions by 2020, 
relative to 2005. Expressed against a 2005 base year, the UK’s 2020 target is a 24 per 
cent reduction. Despite less strict goals in the short and medium-term, Barack 
Obama has announced a target to reduce carbon emissions by 83 per cent by 2050, 
relative to 2005 levels (Bassi and Bowen, 2014). This is more aggressive than the 
UK’s target to reduce carbon emissions by 80 per cent by 2050, relative to 1990 
levels (i.e. a reduction of 76 per cent by 2050 compared with 2005).   
 
Adoption of climate change legislation  
The UK’s 2008 Climate Change Act is widely praised as a trailblazing piece of legislation. 
Other countries have also given legal form to their climate change ambitions: 
 
 A survey of 66 jurisdictions (65 countries plus the EU; Nachmany et al., 2014) found 
that 62 have legal provisions which establish the basis for national climate change 
policy action; although not all of these provisions have the same statutory force as 
the Climate Change Act. Each country in the survey typically passes a climate change 
law every 18-20 months. This suggests climate change has become a core legislative 
concern worldwide.  
 
 The sectors covered and types of legal mechanisms used in UK climate law are 
similar in scope to competitor countries. Practically all developed countries and 
many developing countries have laws covering low-carbon energy supply, energy 
demand, transportation, adaptation, carbon pricing and low-carbon research and 
development.  
 
 The UK has 22 pieces of climate change-related legislation, which is relatively high in 
comparison with other developed countries. The number of laws passed is not a 
good indicator of climate change ambition, as laws differ in scope. But the large 
number of UK laws corroborates an observation made elsewhere that the climate 
change policy landscape in the UK is relatively, and perhaps unnecessarily, complex 
(e.g. Advani et al., 2013; Bassi et al., 2013). 
 
Carbon prices 
In many ways, the carbon price that countries impose on carbon emissions is the most 
tangible indicator of government action and ambition on tackling climate change. 
Carbon pricing can be explicit, for example in the form of a carbon tax, or implicit, as in 
the case of levies supporting renewable energy. Policies resulting in implicit carbon 
prices are often aimed at addressing other market failures than carbon emissions, like 
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those related to innovation. Comparing the carbon price in the UK with carbon prices 
elsewhere shows that: 
 
 International comparisons, for example by the OECD, put current UK carbon prices 
in the middle to upper end of the global range. Carbon taxes range from less than 
£8 per tonne of CO2 (e.g. in Mexico, New Zealand and the United States) to over £70 
per tonne of CO2 (e.g. Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Switzerland). 
Estimates for the UK are around £60 per tonne of CO2, but with a wide variation.  
 
 Emerging markets are also beginning to price carbon, notably China, which has 
implicit current carbon prices in the £23-37 per tonne of CO2 range.  
 
 Medium industrial energy users in the UK pay lower green taxes on their electricity 
bills than the European Union average.   In 2013, the average cost of electricity in the 
European Union for a medium industrial energy user was around £0.13/kWh. Of this, 
taxes (including carbon prices and excluding VAT and other recoverable taxes) were 
around £0.03/kWh, around 23 per cent of total electricity costs. In the UK, the cost 
of electricity for similar users was £0.12€/kWh, and taxes accounted for £0.01/kWh, 
around 8 per cent of total electricity costs. 
 
The evidence thus suggests that the UK is part of a leading group of countries who are 
taking policy action on climate change. The group includes many of the UK’s main 
trading partners. The UK is not acting alone, although, in the Climate Change Act, it has a 
more sophisticated legal basis for action than many of its competitors.  
 
A key area where the UK is ahead of many its competitors is in its forward planning. Few 
other countries are preparing and planning for emissions reductions in the 2020s as the 
UK is, with the fourth carbon budget. European Union Member States will have to do so 
once the European Commission’s 2030 framework for climate and energy policies is 
agreed this year, but the UK is ahead of the curve. Such long-term thinking is laudable 
and a deliberate feature of the Climate Change Act. It provides certainty and forward 
guidance to investors. Of course, it also makes it difficult to gauge how the UK’s targets 
for the 2020s will eventually compare with its competitors.  
 
There is no indication, based on evidence of action over the last decade, that the UK’s 
trading partners will not in due course adopt targets similar to ours for beyond 2020. 
The European Union in particular is already preparing to do so. However, climate policy 
is not without reversals, and there can be no certainty. This is the price of planning 
ahead. 
 
1  Introduction  
Great economic or political advances rarely occur without bold and committed 
leadership from one country, or a small number of countries. 
  
Yet, national governments are fundamentally cautious; they prefer to watch their 
counterparts closely, and move in packs. There are understandable reasons for this. 
While first-movers can reap benefits, moving too far ahead means taking risks, which 
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can be costly. Leadership can be risky because, when breaking new ground, there are 
fewer precedents to learn from. Leadership may also entail incurring unique or higher 
costs than later-movers, with potential implications for economic competitiveness. In 
those areas of policy where the main benefits of a single country’s action materialise 
only with sufficient collective action, these risks and costs are more salient. Climate 
change is one such area.  
 
The UK has long styled itself as a leader on climate change policy action and the UK 
Government has been criticised for moving faster than other countries and, in doing so, 
imperilling our economic competitiveness for scant climatic gain (EEF, 2013). This 
‘unwarranted leadership’ critique has resounded most recently in the debate over the 
review of the UK’s fourth carbon budget (see Box 1).  
 
It is timely, therefore, to systematically examine this critique. Doing so raises three 
fundamental questions:  
 is UK climate change policy more ambitious than that of its competitors?  
 to the extent it is, then, what is the impact of climate change policy on UK 
competitiveness, and; 
 is that policy leadership warranted (e.g. on the basis of international equity or 
macroeconomic considerations)? 
 
The main focus in this policy paper is on the first question, although it also touches on 
the third question insofar as international equity considerations are relevant to the UK’s 
climate change policy ambition. The second question on competitiveness is the subject 
of a separate policy paper (Bassi and Zenghelis, 2014). For the purposes of this paper, we 
define the UK’s ‘competitors’ as the Member States of the European Union (EU), other 
developed countries, and major emerging (and high-emitting) countries, such as China, 
India, Republic of Korea, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. 
 
In order to consider the relative ambition of UK climate change policy, this policy paper 
examines three indicators. First, we compare the UK’s commitments concerning future 
quantities of emissions reductions with those made by competitor countries (section 2). 
These international commitments carry varying legal force, are expressed in different 
ways, reflect different assumptions, and vary in their credibility. Nonetheless, an 
attempt at standardisation is made that allows us to make a broad comparison of the 
UK’s emissions reduction ambitions with its competitors. 
 
Second, we compare the breadth, scope and depth of climate change legislation and 
policy in UK and its competitor countries, drawing on a recent survey of climate change 
policy and legislation in 66 jurisdictions around the world (65 countries and the EU; 
Nachmany et al., 2014).  
 
Third, we examine the cost of carbon in the UK and its competitor countries. Again, 
direct comparisons are difficult due to the differing nature and sectoral scope of 
measures that impose an explicit or implicit carbon cost on businesses and households 
across different countries. We therefore draw only on existing, methodologically robust, 
comparative studies. 
 
The final section summarises our conclusions.  
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Box 1: The review of the fourth carbon budget 
 
The Climate Change Act 2008 commits the UK to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
to at least 80 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050. Under the Act the Government is 
required to set rolling, legally binding, five-year carbon budgets to ensure the UK says on 
the most cost effective emissions reduction pathway towards the 2050 target. The 
budgets also provide a level of predictability for UK businesses and households, better 
enabling them to plan and invest for a low-carbon economy (CCC, 2014). Four carbon 
budgets have so far been enacted, covering the period 2008–2027.  
 
The Committee on Climate Change — an independent expert body that effectively acts 
as custodian of the Climate Change Act — is required under the Act to advise the 
Government on its carbon budgets.  
 
The Committee’s advice on the fourth carbon budget, covering 2023–2027, was issued in 
December 2010 and recommended that the UK reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 
50 per cent, relative to 1990, by 2025. The budget was legislated by the Government in 
June 2011 at the level recommended by the Committee. The Government requested 
that the fourth carbon budget be reviewed in 2014.  
 
The Act prescribes that, once enacted, a carbon budget can only be changed if there is a 
significant change in the circumstances upon which the budget was set, demonstrable 
on the basis of evidence and analysis.  When the Committee completed its review of the 
fourth carbon budget, it concluded in December 2013 that there had been no change in 
circumstance that would justify lowering the ambition in the budget. It therefore 
recommended that the budget remain unchanged. This advice is currently being 
considered by the Government, with a formal decision expected later this year. 
 
 
2 How UK emissions reduction commitments compare 
The fourth carbon budget commits the UK to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 50 
per cent below 1990 levels by 2025 (the mid-point of the 2023–2027 carbon budget 
period). In this section we compare the UK’s 2025 target with the quantified emissions 
reduction or limitation commitments of its competitor countries. We do not cover 
sectoral targets, like vehicle efficiency and/or CO2 standards, as these fall outside the 
scope of this paper.  
 
Of particular relevance is the comparison with the European Union (EU), since the EU-
wide climate objectives create a legally binding framework into which the UK’s fourth 
carbon budget must be integrated.  We therefore look at EU targets first, before turning 
to a wider set of countries. 
 
2.1 European Union emissions reduction commitments 
In January 2014, the European Commission (EC, 2014a) proposed a new framework on 
climate and energy goals for 2030. The framework builds on the existing ‘climate and 
energy package’ of targets for 2020 (EC, 2010) as well as the Commission’s 2050 
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roadmaps for energy (EC, 2011a) and for a competitive low-carbon economy (European 
Commission, 2011b). 
 
The Commission’s core 2030 proposal is a commitment to reduce EU-wide greenhouse 
gas emissions by 40 per cent below the 1990 level. The proposed framework also 
includes an EU-wide target to produce 27 per cent of energy consumed from renewable 
energy sources. However, unlike the 2020 renewable target, the Commission did not 
intend that the 2030 target be translated into mandatory national commitments. The 
Commission’s proposal also includes renewed ambitions for energy conservation, 
although no target for energy efficiency improvement has been set.1  
 
The Commission’s proposal is still under negotiation,2 and has recently been criticised by 
the European Parliament for being ‘short-sighted and unambitious’, especially with 
regard to its renewables and energy efficiency objectives (EP, 2014). The Parliament 
resolved to support instead three 2030 targets: a 40 per cent emissions reduction below 
1990 levels, a 30 per cent renewable energy target, and a 40 per cent energy efficiency 
target. A comparison between the 2020 goals included in the climate and energy 
package and both the Commission’s and Parliament’s 2030 proposed targets, as well as 
the domestic targets in place in the UK, are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Comparison between 2020 and 2030 targets 
Targets 2020 Package 2030 EU Commission’s 
proposal 
2030 EU Parliament’s 
resolution 
 
GHG reduction 
(vs 1990 levels) 
-20 per cent (-30per 
cent if international 
agreement) 
-40 per cent  At least -40 per cent 
ETS sectors -21 per cent (vs 2005 
levels)  
Annual cap reduction 
of  1.74 per cent in 
2013-2020 
-43 per cent (vs 2005 levels) 
Annual cap reduction of  2.2 
per cent in 2020-2030 
Same as 2030 EU 
Commission’s proposal 
Non-ETS sectors -10 per cent (vs 2005 
level) 
-30 per cent (vs 2005 levels) Same as 2030 EU 
Commission’s proposal 
Effort sharing 
(non-ETS): UK 
-16 per cent (vs 2005 
level) 
TBC TBC 
 
Renewables  20 per cent of gross 
final energy 
consumption 
27 per cent of gross final 
energy consumption; 
mandatory at EU level only 
30 per cent of gross final 
energy consumption 
National 
targets: UK 
15 per cent of gross 
final energy 
consumption 
No national targets 
mandated by EU legislation 
TBC 
 
Energy 
Efficiency 
-20 per cent annual 
consumption of 
primary energy 
No target - TBC in the 
review of the Energy 
Efficiency Directive 
-40 per cent annual 
consumption of primary 
energy  
                                                 
1
 Further specifications are expected to be included in the review of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(2012/27/EU), due to be concluded at the end of 2014. 
2
 The European Council is expected to consider the framework at its spring meeting on 20-21 March 
2014, and may resume further talks during its summit in June. A final legislative text may be signed off 
towards the end of 2014, after the EU parliamentary elections in May and a changeover of 
Commissioners later this year (Reuters, 2014).  
    
11 
 
(voluntary)  
National 
targets: UK 
18 per cent (voluntary) No national targets 
mandated by EU legislation 
TBC 
 
Other features Legal framework for 
carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) 
New governance system 
based on national plans. 
New set of indicators to 
assess policy progress and 
impacts (e.g. on trade) 
 
 
Note: targets are mandatory unless otherwise specified 
Source: 2020 Package data based on EC (2014b); 2030 EU Commission’s proposal data based on EC 
(2014a);  2030 EU Parliament’s resolution data based on EP (2014) ; UK energy efficiency target based 
on HM Government (2012) 
Assuming the 40 per cent emissions reduction target for 2030 is adopted,3 it would need 
to be divided among EU-member states as part of the EU’s internal effort sharing 
arrangements. How exactly the target would be shared has not yet been determined. 
However, the approach taken for the 2020 climate and energy package provides an 
instructive precedent.  
 
In the 2020 package the EU emission reduction target of 20 per cent was divided into, on 
the one hand, the sectors covered by the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) and, on the other hand, non-EU ETS sectors. For practical reasons, these separate 
contributions were expressed in terms of emissions reductions relative to 2005 levels — 
the year the EU ETS commenced operation.  
 
The 2020 target for non-ETS sectors was then further differentiated into national targets 
according to the relative GDP per capita of Member States. The average 2020 target for 
non-ETS sectors was set at 10 per cent from 2005 across the EU, but for countries with a 
GDP above the EU average, like the UK, the national contribution was higher, reflecting 
considerations about relative wealth and cost-effectiveness. The UK’s national 
contribution to the non-ETS 2020 target was 16 per cent.  
 
Figure 1 shows how the UK domestic target compares with those of other countries. This 
provides a rough guide as to the relative effort expected of the EU’s wealthier members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This is a reasonable assumption for present purposes, given the agreement between the European 
Commission and Parliament regarding the 40per cent 2030 target. 
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Figure 1. EU Member State greenhouse gas emissions reduction in 2020 (relative to 
2005 levels), non- ETS sectors 
 
Source: Based on EP and Council (2009) 
The 2030 proposal is also split into an ETS and a non-ETS component. The 40 per cent 
emissions reduction target by 2030 would imply that the annual reduction in the ‘cap’ on 
emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS would be increased from the current 1.74 
per cent  to 2.2 per cent after 2020 (i.e. the cap would tighten more quickly post-2020).4 
Under the Commission’s proposal, emissions from sectors outside the EU ETS would 
need to be cut by 30 per cent below their 2005 level, and this effort would be shared 
among EU member states.  
 
UK GDP has not changed significantly relative to the EU average since the 2020 package 
was agreed. Therefore, if national contributions are determined using a similar approach 
to that used to allocate effort for the 2020 targets package, the UK’s targets will again be 
significantly higher than the EU average for the non-ETS sector, alongside countries like 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and France. Figure 2 shows an indicative split for 
the non-ETS emissions, as estimated in the Impact Assessment (EC, 2014d) 
accompanying the European Commissions’ 2030 proposal. Contributions are split 
between 2030 reference emission reductions (in light green in Figure 3), which reflect 
existing policies and trends, and the additional reductions (in darker green) required to 
meet the 40 per cent target.5 
 
                                                 
4
 The European Commission’s Communication is accompanied by a legislative proposal for a market 
stability reserve for the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) starting in 2021 (EC, 
2014c). The market stability reserve will consist of an automatic adjustment of the supply of 
auctioned allowanced downwards or upwards, based on a pre-defined set of rules, in order to 
improve the resilience of the EU ETS to market shocks and enhance market stability.  
5
 The Impact Assessment (EC, 2014c) refers to these additional emission reductions as to the ‘2030 
policy scenarios deviation from the reference scenario level’. For the 40 per cent reduction scenario 
two estimates are made, a minimum and a maximum deviation. In Figure 3 we have taken the 
average between these two. 
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Figure 2. EU Member State greenhouse gas potential emissions reductions in 2030 
(relative to 2005 levels), non-ETS sectors 
 
Source: Based on European Commission (2014d) 
 
How might the UK’s targets, as apportioned under the EU’s effort share arrangements, 
compare with the targets contained in the fourth carbon budget? At the time the budget 
was set, it was calculated to be consistent with the EU 2011 ‘Roadmap for moving to a 
competitive low carbon economy in 2050’ (EC, 2011b). The roadmap envisaged 
emissions reductions of around 40 per cent by 2030 relative to 1990 across the EU — the 
same 2030 target that the Commission has now actually proposed – which suggests that 
the fourth carbon budget may be broadly consistent with the latest EU proposals. In 
fact, in the case of the ETS sector, analysis by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 
2013a) shows that the projected UK share of the EU ETS cap is exactly as anticipated in 
the fourth carbon budget.6  
 
The implications of this analysis are two-fold. First, there is a clear case for aligning the 
UK’s greenhouse gas ambitions with those of the EU, given how closely UK targets are 
embedded in EU-wide policy. But, second, the UK’s fourth carbon budget looks broadly 
consistent with, and unlikely to be more stringent than the UK’s EU-determined fair 
share of the EU’s 2030 target. Therefore, the fourth carbon budget does not mean that 
that the UK is ‘going it alone’ with its climate change policy. The emissions reduction 
target it sets is likely to be in line with those that will be allocated to other leading EU 
Member States as part of the effort sharing arrangements for the proposed new 
framework on climate and energy goals for 2030.  
 
2.2 International emissions reduction commitments 
We now compare the UK’s fourth carbon budget target with the economy-wide, 
quantified emissions limitation and reduction targets pledged by other countries in the 
                                                 
6
 The projected UK share of the EU ETS cap under the Fourth carbon budget is 690 MtCO2. The 
estimated UK share consistent with the EU Roadmap’s overall 40 per cent target is 650 MTCO2 
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context of ongoing international climate change negotiations within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
 
The comparisons most relevant to the UK are with other countries listed in Annex I to 
the UNFCCC (roughly a list of ‘developed’ countries). These countries were allocated 
legally binding emissions reduction or limitation targets under the Kyoto Protocol, 
reflecting countries’ ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities’ — a measure of international equity — as interpreted by UNFCCC members 
at the time. However, given the growth in wealth and emissions outside Annex 1, we 
also make comparisons with key developing countries, including major trade partners 
such as South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, China, India and Mexico, among others. 
 
Since the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP15) in Copenhagen in 2009, 
countries have been pledging their emissions reduction or limitation targets with the 
expectation that these will be a central component of a new international treaty or 
other legal instrument expected to be agreed at the 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP21) in Paris in late 2015.7 A recent survey of 65 countries and the EU, which 
together account for almost 90 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions (Nachmany 
et al., 2014; discussed below in section 2) found that 38 jurisdictions have made 
commitments as part of this process, mostly for the period 2020-2025, including 19 of 
the 20 surveyed Annex-I jurisdictions (all except Turkey). Moreover, 20 jurisdictions have 
reflected their targets in domestic legislation. A few countries are also envisaging longer 
term targets, up to 2050. 
 
These pledges are set out in Table 2. They vary in their form and assumptions, making 
comparison difficult. Targets can be defined as a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
relative to either a historical base year (in which emissions are known) or a forward-
looking, business-as-usual scenario (which is projected). They may be absolute or 
relative to other socio-economic trends, such as GDP or population growth. To facilitate 
comparison, Table 2 also translates the UK’s commitments under the third and fourth 
carbon budget – which are absolute, statutory targets over a five-year period – into the 
metrics chosen by competitor countries. 
 
The information in Table 2 shows that UK’s carbon targets are broadly similar to those of 
other European countries and, as we have seen above, consistent with EU-wide effort 
sharing rules. The UK’s targets are, however, more ambitious than some industrialised 
countries outside Europe in the short to medium-term, for example the United States. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite less strict goals in the short and medium-
term, Barack Obama has announced a target to reduce carbon emissions by 83 per cent 
by 2050, relative to 2005 levels (Bassi and Bowen, 2014). This is more aggressive than 
the UK’s target to reduce carbon emissions by 80 per cent by 2050, relative to 1990 
levels (i.e. a reduction of 76 per cent by 2050 compared with 2005).   
 
Table 2 also shows that developing countries — particularly large, rapidly industrialising, 
high-emitting developing countries — are increasingly willing to make quantified 
emissions reduction or limitation pledges. This reflects a growing acknowledgement of 
                                                 
7
 Many of these pledges were included in the table annexed to the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 
2010a) or subsequent iterations of that table (e.g. including in the Cancun Agreements: UNFCCC, 
2011). For Annex I countries’ quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 see UNFCC (2010b)  
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mitigation responsibility by developing countries, particularly from 2009 onwards, and 
perhaps a corresponding weakening of the ‘firewall’ that historically separated Annex I 
from non-Annex I countries. However, when comparing developing country pledges and 
commitments with those of the UK, it is important to remember that the UK, as one of 
the world’s richest countries, is expected to shoulder appropriately ‘differentiated’ 
commitments relative to those countries.  
 
Table 2. Climate change targets: country commitments pledges to UNFCCC/flagship 
legislation 
Type of Target (countries) Key examples UK equivalent (if UK targets 
were expressed in same way) 
Absolute emissions reduction 
below historical base-year level  
(Australia, Canada, Dominican 
Republic, Ethiopia, EU [e.g. 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden], 
Japan, Maldives, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Ukraine, USA, 
Vietnam) 
Australia: 5-25 per cent* 
reduction below 2000 levels by 
2020   
26 per cent below 2000 by 2020 
USA: 17 per cent reduction 
below 2005 levels by 2020, 83 
per cent reduction below 2005 
levels by 2050  
24 per cent below 2005 by 2020 
76 per cent below 2005 by 2050 
Canada: 17 per cent reduction 
below 2005 levels by 2020 
24 per cent below 2005 by 2020 
Denmark: 40 per cent reduction 
below 1990 by 2020, 
conditional 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
France: 30 per cent reduction 
below 1990 by 2020, 
conditional 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
Germany: 40 per cent reduction 
below 1990 levels by 2020  
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
Norway: 30-40 per cent below 
1990 by 2020; carbon neutrality 
(i.e. 100 per cent below) by 
2030 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
50 per cent below 1990 by 2025 
Poland: 30 per cent reduction 
below 1990 by 2020 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
Sweden: 30 per cent from 1990 
by 2020, carbon neutrality by 
2050 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
80 per cent below 1990 by 2050 
Maldives: Carbon neutrality (i.e.  
100 per cent below 1990 levels) 
by 2020 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
Costa Rica: Carbon neutrality 
(i.e. 100 per cent below 1990 
levels) by 2021 
34 per cent below 1990 by 2020 
Reduction in GHG emissions 
intensity of economic output 
(China, India) 
China: reduce emissions 
intensity of GDP by 40–45 per 
cent below 2005 by 2020 
39 per cent below 2005 levels 
by 2020 
 
India: Reduce emissions 
intensity of GDP by 20 per cent-
25 per cent below 2005 by 2025 
58 per cent below 2005 levels 
by 2025 
Emissions reduction below a 
business as usual (BAU) 
scenario  
(Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Israel, 
Range: -20 per cent to -38.9 per 
cent (Vs. BAU) by 2020 
 
N/A 
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Mexico, South Africa, South 
Korea) 
* The 5 per cent reduction is unconditional. Higher amounts are conditional on the level of action by 
other countries and on agreement regarding other relevant matters, including flexibility and 
accounting rules. Australia’s climate policy is currently under review [tbc: What are the plans for the 
targets? Will they be kept]. 
**The UK has also a planning assumption of 60 per cent reduction below 1990 by 2030, expressed by 
the Committee on Climate Change in its original fourth carbon budget advice. There will be no formal 
2030 target until fifth carbon budget for 2028-2032 is legislated in 2016. 
Source: Nachmany et al., 2014 
 
What stands out among developing countries are the commitments made by China. 
They are expressed as greenhouse gas intensity targets (that is, emissions per unit of 
GDP) and are similar to, if not slightly more ambitious than, the UK targets translated 
into the same metric (assuming UK GDP growth of 2-2.5 per cent going forward). China is 
by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases and its per capita emissions are now 
approaching EU levels. However, average income per person in China is still less than 
one sixth of that in the UK.  
 
Overall, Britain’s carbon targets put it into the ‘leading pack’ of large developed country 
emitters. All but one of the UK’s competitor countries have quantified emissions 
reduction or limitation targets (the exception being Turkey), and only a small number of 
developing countries have made no quantifiable commitment at all.  The leaders of the 
pack are four countries that aspire to become carbon neutral within the next few 
decades: the Maldives by 2020, Costa Rica by 2021, Norway by 2030 and Sweden by 
2050.  
 
3 How UK climate change policy and legislation compares 
Whereas section 2 examined countries’ quantifiable emissions reduction and limitation 
targets, this section considers countries’ domestic climate change policy and legislation 
more broadly. The aim is to provide a richer understanding of the trends in regulatory 
commitment by governments worldwide to tackling climate change. We draw heavily on 
a recent study by the Grantham Research Institute and GLOBE International (Nachmany 
et al., 2014), which surveys climate change laws and policies in 66 jurisdictions (65 
countries plus the EU). The focus is on trends in the breadth (number of countries taking 
regulatory action), scope (sectoral coverage or type of measure) and depth (normative 
force and institutional architecture) of countries’ actions.  
3.1 Breadth in climate change legislation and policy 
In terms of legislative breadth, the GLOBE study finds that the 20 of the Annex I 
jurisdictions (19 countries and the EU) covered in the study have passed an aggregate of 
194 climate laws,8 compared with 293 laws in the 46 non-Annex I countries covered. Of 
                                                 
8
 The GLOBE study defines laws as “Legislation, or regulations, policies and decrees with a 
comparable status, that refer specifically to climate change or that relate to reducing energy 
demand, promoting low carbon energy supply, tackling deforestation, promoting sustainable 
land use, sustainable transportation, or adaptation to climate impacts.” Only federal 
legislation has been taken into account. 
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these nearly 500 laws, roughly 60 per cent were legal acts passed by parliaments and 40 
per cent were executive orders or policies. On average, a typical country passes a 
climate law every 18-20 months. This suggests that in most countries — and certainly 
the UK’s competitor countries — climate change has become a serious legislative 
concern and regulatory steps are taken to address it. 
 
Moreover, 62 of the 66 jurisdictions have passed unifying climate change legislation, or 
‘flagship laws’, that define their approach to climate change. Some flagship laws are 
aspirational, rather than binding, and not all of them have the statutory force of an act 
of parliament; in some countries the main climate policy is an executive order or 
government white paper. Nevertheless, most of the UK’s competitors have, like the UK, 
put in place a firm statutory basis for their national action to tackle climate change. 
Table 3 lists the flagship climate laws of some of the UK’s key competitor countries. 
 
Table 3. Selected competitor countries and their flagship laws 
Jurisdiction Flagship climate change law 
EU Climate and Energy Package (2008) 
France Grenelle I and II (2009 / 2010) 
Germany Integrated Climate and Energy Programme (2007, rev. 2008) 
Italy Climate Change Action Plan (2007) 
Japan Law Concerning the Promotion of Measures to Cope with Global Warming (1998, 
rev. 2005) 
Netherlands New Energy for Climate Policy: The Clean and Efficient Programme (2007) 
New Zealand Climate Change Response Act (2002) 
Australia Clean Energy Future package / Clean Energy Act (2011) 
USA Clean Air Act (1963, rev. 1976, 1990)* 
Brazil National Policy on Climate Change (2009) 
China 12th Five‐Year Plan (2011) 
India National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008) 
Mexico General Law on Climate Change (2012) 
South Africa National Climate Change Response Policy White Paper (2011) 
South Korea Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth (2009) 
* The US Clean Air Act was not originally established to address climate change. However, on 15 
December 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency finalised an “endangerment finding” under 
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, which requires it to regulate pollutants for their effect as 
greenhouse gas emissions for the first time. See: 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/ 
Source: Nachmany et al 2014. 
 
There is an upward trend in climate change regulatory action generally, and flagship 
laws in particular. Figure 3 shows the number of climate change laws passed in 
aggregate each year since 1990. The peak is around 2008-2010 — the same time as the 
UK’s Climate Change Act —a period during which many developed countries passed 
their flagship climate change legislation. These countries have now turned to focus 
primarily on implementing these laws. More recently, legislative activity has been driven 
mainly by non-Annex I countries — there were 18 new flagship laws passed in 2012-13 
and 14 of these were passed in non-Annex I countries— further demonstrating the 
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growing acknowledgement of responsibility for climate change action among developing 
countries in the post-Copenhagen period that was noted earlier.  
 
The upward trend notwithstanding, reversals are possible. Canada reversed its Kyoto 
Protocol commitment, Japan has lowered its post-2012 ambition, and the new 
Australian Government has flagged its intention to attempt to repeal Australia’s carbon 
pricing legislation in the second half of 2014. Reversals are, however, exceptional: the 
overwhelming trend is for new climate laws each year to add to the ‘stock’ of laws that 
countries are already implementing.  
 
Figure 3. Climate change legislation over time 
 
 
Source: Nachmany et al.(2014) 
Care should be taken when interpreting the number of laws per country. It is not on its 
own a good indicator of the quality of a country’s regulatory environment, or its 
ambition on climate change action.  Legislative approaches differ and what is primary 
legislation in one country may be an implementing regulation in another. More 
generally, a large number of laws can be a sign of an excessive regulatory burden as 
much as of an enabling business environment. This issue may be pertinent for the UK 
and its 22 climate change laws (see Box 2). 
 
Box 2:  Climate change legislation and policy complexity 
The UK has 22 climate change laws — one of the highest counts worldwide. The number 
of laws per country is not on its own a good indicator of the quality of a country’s 
regulatory environment on climate change or any other issue. Nonetheless, it may be 
indicative of previous findings that the UK has a relatively complex climate policy 
landscape that is subject to frequent revisions.  
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Different climate change related policies tend to overlap and have sometimes created 
unexpected and/or undesirable interactions (Bassi et al., 2013). Notably, energy users 
can be subject to different measures and be charged for carbon dioxide emissions 
several times over (see also section 4 below). There is no single carbon price applying to 
all users and fuels, but rather a complex set of prices exists which tend to change over 
time, when one or more pieces of legislation is revised.  
 
Some overlaps may be unavoidable, for example when more than one policy is required 
to tackle different market externalities, such as greenhouse gases and research and 
development failures (Bassi et al., 2013). Others, however, are less justifiable and can 
create unnecessary burdens. Interactions of this type can reduce policy effectiveness 
and transparency. 
 
Other countries experience similar large variability across tax rates, either due to the 
interaction of different policies or because several exemptions apply. An analysis of nine 
European countries, for instance, shows that Greece has the largest variation across 
domestic carbon prices, nearly twice the level of variation found in Spain, the country 
with the most consistent set of rates (Vivid Economics, 2012; OECD, 2013). 
 
3.2 Scope of climate change legislation and policy 
The scope of the UK’s 22 climate-related laws is wide, covering energy supply, energy 
demand, transportation, adaptation, carbon pricing, and research and development 
(along with detailed institutional arrangements to implement these laws). Table 4 shows 
the number of UK laws addressing each of these areas (some laws address more than 
one issue, and legislation that merely implements EU law has not been included).  
 
Table 4. Categorisation of UK laws 
No. of 
Laws 
Pricing carbon Energy 
Demand 
Energy Supply REDD+ and 
LULUCF 
Transportation Adaptation Research and 
Development 
Institutions/ 
Administrative 
Arrangements 
22 4  13  14  0  5 1 3 2 
Note: a law may fall into more than one category; excludes legislation that merely implements EU 
laws. 
The sectors covered and types of mechanisms used in UK climate law are similar in scope 
to its competitor countries. In most Annex I countries, most of the above categories are 
covered, with the exception of adaptation and land/forestry sector measures (REDD+ 
and LULUCF). Of the 66 jurisdictions examined in the GLOBE study, 60 have legislation 
covering energy supply, 54 have legislation covering energy demand (especially energy 
efficiency) and 27 price carbon (again, most laws can be categorised under more than 
one category). From this analysis (subject to concerns discussed in Box 2), there is 
nothing to suggest that the scope of UK coverage is unreasonably ambitious relative to 
its competitors. 
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3.3 The depth of climate change legislation and policy 
An excellent indicator of a country’s commitment to tackling climate change is the 
extent to which its objectives and policies impose specific, legally binding obligations and 
the extent (if any) to which institutions are accountable for implementing or overseeing 
the achievement of those obligations (and the quality of those institutions) – referred to 
here as the depth of legislation and policy.  
 
The UK Climate Change Act — with its mandatory emissions reduction targets, rolling 
carbon budgets, institutional architecture (the Committee on Climate Change) and 
regular climate change risk assessments — is widely regarded as a model of legal and 
institutional depth (Lockwood, 2013). The Act establishes a clear framework for medium- 
to long-term future action that provides businesses and households with greater 
predictability so that they can plan their economic affairs.  
 
All of the UK’s competitor countries have governmental departments (either central or 
arms-length) that oversee the formulation and implementation of climate change 
legislation and policy, and provide roadmaps for the accomplishment of targets, often to 
2030 or 2050. Brazil has an Inter-ministerial Commission on Climate Change, composed 
of 9 ministries; South Africa has an Inter-ministerial Committee on Climate Change; 
Australia has a Climate Change Authority, and Denmark has a Climate Council. In the 
United States, the Environmental Protection Agency is instrumental in climate policy, 
and the EU established in 2010 a Directorate General on Climate Change (DG Climate), 
which has assumed the climate responsibilities previously held by the DG Environment in 
the European Commission. Recently, China has strengthened its top-level planning on 
climate change, appointing the Premier as the leader of the National Leading Group for 
Addressing Climate Change, and placing provincial governors at the head of sub-national 
groups. 
 
All pieces of flagship legislation in the UK’s competitor countries include institutional 
arrangements, whether existing or new, to support the meeting of targets and to 
provide a framework for climate change policy action. In Australia, 6 of the 9 laws have 
institutional aspects to them, as do 5 of the 12 laws in Germany, 12 of the 14 laws in 
Brazil, 3 of the 5 laws in China, 6 of the 10 laws in India, 4 of the 8 in Japan and 9 of the 
15 laws in South Korea. 
 
Overall, the UK’s strong institutional framework, which supports its climate action, is 
often seen as a leading institutional model. Some object that domestically it has perhaps 
not produced the level of political certainty its creators had hoped for (Lockwood, 2013), 
but internationally it has ‘strengthened the UK’s position … to help raise the ambition 
and urgency of collective action to tackle climate change’ (DECC, 2013b).  Australia’s 
Climate Change Authority, for example, was modelled on the UK Climate Change 
Committee, although the future of that body is uncertain, as was the Danish Climate 
Council (RTCC, 2014). Nevertheless, it is clear that the UK does not operate in a vacuum.  
Many competitor countries have equivalent provisions suited to their institutional 
contexts. So while the UK’s institutional arrangements can be described as robust and 
inspiring, the UK cannot be described as ‘alone’ in making them. 
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4 How UK carbon prices compare 
In this section we compare the UK’s climate change measures with those of other 
countries by reference to the price of carbon imposed on each economy. Carbon prices 
provide a direct and tangible means of comparing the ambition and economic effects of 
climate policy. They are also an important starting point for evaluating the impacts of 
policy on competitiveness across different economies. The issue of competitiveness, in 
the context of the fourth carbon budget review, is discussed in a companion paper (Bassi 
and Zenghelis, 2014).  
 
Pricing carbon is at the core of climate change policy (see Box 3). Carbon prices can be 
imposed explicitly, in the form of a carbon tax or emissions trading system, or implicitly, 
in the form of costs imposed by climate change regulation. The UK has several 
instruments in place that result in an explicit or implicit carbon price. These include 
energy taxes like the Climate Change Levy, discounted rates embedded in the Climate 
Change Agreements, and the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme. The UK is also part of the 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), and has recently introduced a 
carbon price floor for electricity generators involved in emission trading.   
 
The UK is not alone in this. A large number of countries have also introduced a wide 
range of climate policies that apply an implicit or explicit carbon price. The GLOBE study 
(Nachmany et al., 2014) indicates that at least 27 jurisdictions have a form of carbon 
pricing legislation in place9, including the European Union (EU) and several non-EU 
European countries, as well as other developed and developing countries including 
Canada, China, Japan, India, Mexico and Russia.  
 
Box 3. Climate change externalities  and carbon prices 
The case for carbon pricing rests on the economic analyses of externalities – 
circumstances where the effect of production or consumption of goods and services 
imposes costs or benefits on others, that are not reflected in the prices charged to the 
final consumers (Bowen, 2011). As those who produce greenhouse gas emissions are 
imposing potentially huge costs on other people over time, policy can intervene to 
impose a price on their externalities.  This price signal is typically enforced through 
carbon taxes or similar instruments, such as levies on energy consumption (which can be 
translated into a carbon price) or the trading of emission allowances. Empirical evidence 
shows that higher energy prices can reduce energy demand (e.g. Agnolucci, 2009; 
Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007) and induce energy-saving technical progress (e.g. Popp, 2002; 
Aghion et al., 2010). Additional policies are also needed to tackle other market failures,10 
particularly to promote low-carbon innovation and appropriate infrastructure 
investment. These include, for example, targets and/or subsidies for renewable sources 
and energy efficiency technologies, support for the development of adaptation 
                                                 
9
 Some carbon pricing mechanisms apply only to smaller areas within a jurisdiction, such as domestic 
carbon taxes in a number of EU Member States or emission trading between some Canadian 
regions. 
10
 There is a vast literature on the various market failures related to climate change, in particular in 
relation to innovation and research & development, network effects and technology spillovers, 
uncertainties and asymmetric information, and interactions of environmental and labour market 
imperfection. For an overview, see for example (Bowen, 2011) and references therein.  
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measures and so forth. These policies on their own, however, may not be able to bring 
about the necessary reductions in emissions. Without carbon pricing, for instance, 
measures that increase energy efficiency can make energy use cheaper, generating a 
‘rebound’ effect where an increase in energy demand offsets emissions reductions 
(Bowen, 2011). Some form of carbon pricing is therefore an essential element of an 
optimal policy portfolio.   
 
Because domestic policies are typically heterogeneous and can overlap (see Box 2 
above), it is not always easy to compare the effective carbon prices in place across the 
world. A few studies have attempted such comparison, with differing results due to 
differences in methodology. For example, methods may differ in which policies they take 
into account and how prices are averaged across fuels (like electricity, gas, coal) and 
energy uses (residential, industrial, or sector-specific). The main findings of three studies 
(OECD, 2013; Vivid Economics, 2012; Australian Productivity Commission, 2011) are 
summarised in Figure 4 and shown in more detail in Appendix 1. The figure shows that 
the UK tends to impose carbon prices in the middle-to-high range, although several 
countries impose higher carbon prices, at least in some sectors. 
 
The OECD (2013) carried out a systematic comparative analysis of energy taxes in OECD 
countries in 2012. It focuses on taxes levied directly on energy consumption.11 The 
analysis shows substantial differences across and within countries. Countries differ in 
the range of energy products that are taxed, in tax base definitions and in tax rate levels 
and rebates, with average carbon prices across fuels ranging from around £2/tCO2 in 
Mexico to £76/tCO2
12 in Luxembourg. Inconsistencies exist also within each country, as 
large disparities are encountered in the carbon prices applied to different energy 
products and uses. The lowest carbon prices are in Australia, New Zealand and the 
Americas (Chile, Canada, Mexico and the United States). Slightly higher rates are found 
in Central European and Asian OECD member countries. The UK sits around the mid-
point, while the highest rates are found in European countries with explicit carbon taxes, 
like Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. These are also 
countries where carbon prices tend to be more consistent across energy products.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The analysis does not include taxes that that may be related to energy use but that are not imposed 
directly on the energy product, such as vehicle taxes, road user charges or taxes on emissions such as 
NOx and SOx which do not have a fixed relationship to fuel volume. 
12
 Using an average exchange rate of €1 = €0.811 in 2012 
    
23 
 
Figure 4. Estimated carbon prices in selected countries, averaged over energy products 
and users (£/tCO2) 
 
Source: Based on OECD (2013); Vivid Economics (2012); Productivity Commission (PC, 2011) 
 
A study by Vivid Economics (2012) compared average carbon taxes across fuels in nine 
European countries: France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
and the UK. Despite a different method, the price estimates are similar to those 
estimated by the OECD (2013). This study, too, reveals significant differences across 
countries, although price disparities within the EU are less pronounced than in other 
regions. In the countries under analysis, average carbon prices range from £28/tCO2 in 
Poland, to £63/tCO2 in Italy.
13 The UK is in the mid-upper end, with an average carbon 
price of £58/tCO2. 
 
The Australian Government’s Productivity Commission (PC, 2011) also estimated 
effective carbon prices in several countries. The analysis included both explicit carbon 
prices from emission taxes and tradable permits, as well as implicit prices embedded in 
other measures, such as regulations of technologies, renewable energy targets, or 
subsidies for low emissions technology. Because it included a wider set of policies, prices 
are generally higher than the estimates discussed above. Lower bound estimates range 
from £5/tCO2 in New Zealand to £145/tCO2 in South Korea.
14 The UK carbon price is 
again somewhere in the middle, at around £48/tCO2. 
 
Many government bodies, businesses and other organisations also use shadow prices of 
carbon (i.e. theoretical prices to be used in project appraisal) to guide their investment. 
These can also offer a useful benchmark when comparing carbon prices, as they are an 
indication of future expectations, even if policies are not yet enforced. In the UK, the 
shadow carbon price used for policy appraisal by the Department on Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC, 2013a) is around £4/tCO2 for the sectors covered by the EU ETS, and 
around £60/tCO2 for all other sectors in 2014. DECC expects both EU ETS and non-ETS 
carbon prices to reach £76/tCO2 in 2030.  
                                                 
13
 Using an average exchange rate of €1 = £0.811 in 2012 
14
 Using an average exchange rate of AUS$1 = £0.644 in 2011. 
    
24 
 
 
Elsewhere, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2013) and other federal 
agencies have used a carbon price ranging from £7-70/tCO2
 15 in 2015 for policy 
assessments, rising to £10-103/tCO2 in 2030. Several private companies in the United 
States have also adopted some form of shadow pricing for business planning, ranging 
from £4-36/tCO2
16 (CDP, 2013).  A number of large energy companies in Canada have 
used shadow carbon prices of £8-38/tCO2
17 (SP, 2013). Thus, even in countries like the 
United States, which currently has no nation-wide explicit carbon tax or trading 
scheme,18 some public and private bodies are expecting and planning for higher carbon 
prices in the future. 
 
This wide set of estimates reveals how difficult it is to define the boundaries of carbon 
pricing. Indeed, these values may not reflect all the nuances of domestic carbon policies 
and should be considered as only indicative.  
 
For the UK, for instance, the OECD (2013) study only takes into account the carbon price 
embedded in the fuel duty and in the Climate Change Levy — the two main policies 
applying to transport and industry. The former is analytically more complex to translate 
into a carbon price, because transport policies usually aim to address externalities other 
than carbon emissions, such as congestion. The addition of other policies — like the EU 
ETS, Renewables Obligation, feed-in tariffs, the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme and others 
— would have resulted in a multi-layered, often higher carbon price estimate, 
depending on which energy users are affected and how policies overlap. However, a 
similar bias probably applies in other countries too, it should not necessarily be expected 
that the UK’s relative position has been understated in that study. 
 
Studies by Advani et al. (2013) and by Bassi et al. (2013), for instance, illustrate how UK 
carbon prices tend to differ across households and business sectors, as well as across 
different fuels when a number of climate change related policies are taken into 
account.19 So, for example, in the case of electricity, carbon prices can range from about 
£39/tCO2 for energy intensive industries to about £69/tCO2 for medium-sized firms, and 
are around £6/tCO2 for households. Other fuels, like gas, coal and LPG, are often taxed 
less than electricity. 
 
Similar variations are found in other countries. Switzerland, for example, has a carbon 
price on heating and process fuels of around £24/tCO2
20, but businesses adopting 
binding emission reduction targets can be exempted (Ecofys, 2013). Businesses are also 
                                                 
15
 Using an average exchange rate of US$1 = £0.607 in January 2014 
16
 As above 
17
 Using an average exchange rate of C$1 = £0.557 in January 2014 
18
 Some emission trading systems are in place at regional level, namely the California’s cap-and-trade 
system (AB32), and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) between Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. California 
is also part of the Western Climate Initiative, a cap-and–trade programme with four Canadian regions. 
19
 These include four policies resulting in an explicit carbon price, namely the EU ETS, the Climate   
Change Levy, the Climate Change Agreement and the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, and two 
policies leading to an implicit carbon price, the Renewable Obligation and the Feed-In Tariffs. 
20
 In national currency, the CO2 levy in early 2014 was CHF 36. The average exchange rate in January 
2014 was: 1CHF = £0.673.  
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exempt if they participate in the Swiss emissions trading system,21 in which case they are 
either subject to the carbon price set by the market or are eligible for free allowance 
allocations. 
 
Concerns over competitiveness, related to unilateral climate change policies, should be 
seen in the broader context of energy price differentials. Carbon pricing is in fact but one 
component, and often a relatively small one, of total energy prices. For example, in the 
EU, in 2013 the average electricity cost for a medium industrial energy user22 was 
around £0.13/kWh. Of this, taxes (including carbon prices and excluding VAT and other 
taxes recoverable in future periods) were around £0.03/kWh. By comparison, the cost of 
electricity for similar users in the UK was £0.12/kWh, and taxes accounted for only 
£0.01/kWh23 (Eurostat, 2014b). Thus, while carbon policies can represent a non-
negligible cost for households and businesses, it is energy wholesale prices and network 
costs that constitute the largest share of energy bills. Existing evidence suggests that the 
current level of carbon prices in countries with climate change policies, including the UK, 
has not led so far to competitiveness losses (see Bassi & Zenghelis, 2014; and references 
therein).  
 
Despite the variations across estimates in the various studies, two robust conclusions 
can be made. First, most of the UK’s competitor countries impose carbon prices on 
businesses and households — the UK is far from acting alone in pricing carbon. Second, 
UK carbon prices are in the middle-upper range of competitor country prices. Some 
countries have lower carbon prices than the UK, but several countries have carbon 
prices that are at a similar level, or higher than, those in the UK.  
 
The relative position of the UK compared to its competitors may well change in the 
future. While the UK has a policy commitment to a rising carbon price (through the 
carbon price floor), it is unclear what carbon price other countries may adopt in the 
future. While it is not possible to make predictions, the legislative analysis outlined in 
section 3 suggests that increasing numbers of countries are adopting climate change 
related policies which may result in a form of carbon pricing, and that more ambitious 
policies may be implemented in the future.  Projections by the Committee on Climate 
Change (2013b), for instance, estimate significantly higher carbon prices in the UK than 
other countries in 2020, but show convergence through the 2020s, the extent of which 
depends on the carbon price scenario chosen.  
 
5 Conclusions 
This policy paper has sought to answer the question: is the UK’s fourth carbon budget 
likely to put Britain ahead of its competitors when it comes to climate change policy? 
The analysis provided here finds that the UK remains a global leader in the way it tackles 
climate change, but it is by no means acting alone.  
 
                                                 
21
 In 2013 the Swiss ETS involved approximately 50 firms emitting around 6 million tonnes of CO2  [ref: 
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/10923/index.html?lang=en]  
22
 According to Eurostat (2014a), a medium standard industrial consumer has an annual electricity 
consumption between 500 and 2 000 MWh  
23
 Using an average exchange rate of €1 = £0.849 in 2013 
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Three different approaches are used to reach this conclusion. 
 
The analysis first compared the UK’s fourth carbon budget target of a 50 per cent 
reduction in emissions below the 1990 level by 2025, with the greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction and limitation targets that have been adopted at the European Union (EU) 
level and in other countries. The conclusion is that the UK’s fourth carbon budget target 
is likely to be consistent with the target proposed by the European Commission and 
Parliament, once the EU’s internal effort-sharing arrangements are taken into 
consideration. Previous EU greenhouse gas targets have been met by allocating 
individual targets to Member States based on effort-sharing according to the general 
principle that the richest countries per capita should reduce their emissions fastest. 
 
Beyond the EU, all but one of the UK’s main trading partners and competitors (Turkey) 
has a quantified greenhouse gas emissions reduction or limitation targets. While the 
UK’s target is higher than in many of these other countries, it is not the highest. One 
surprising comparison is with China. When expressed as a percentage reduction in the 
emissions intensity of economic output, China’s target is on a par with, and perhaps 
even slightly more ambitious than, the UK’s.  
 
Secondly, the analysis compared the UK’s climate change legislation with the climate-
related legal instruments of other countries. We find a wide breadth of climate change 
legislative activity across the world — the GLOBE survey of 66 jurisdictions found that 62 
of them have legal provisions that establish the basis for action against climate change, 
as the UK has in the Climate Change Act — suggesting that climate change has become a 
core legislative concern. Moreover, the sectors covered and types of mechanisms used 
in UK climate law are similar in scope to competitor countries. We also find that most 
other countries have created high-level institutions for overseeing the implementation 
of climate change legislation and policy. 
 
Finally, the analysis considered the carbon prices imposed on firms and households in 
competitor countries, explicitly or implicitly. While measuring and comparing carbon 
prices is difficult and highly sensitive to the methodology used, this review of three 
comparative studies found that the UK’s carbon prices are in the middle to upper end of 
the global range. In this context, it is worth emphasising that carbon pricing is often a 
relatively minor component of total energy prices. 
 
The overall picture is one in which the UK is part of a leading group of countries taking 
legislative action to tackle climate change. This leading group includes most of the UK’s 
main trading partners.  
 
Climate ambition has to be assessed relative to a country’s economic capabilities and 
international responsibilities. Analysis here has shown that developed countries typically 
have more ambitious targets, more extensive legislative and institutional arrangements, 
and higher carbon prices. This is an unsurprising finding given that virtually every 
country has endorsed the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. 
However, we find increasingly ambitious commitments — especially post-2009 — across 
the major emerging (and high emitting) economies. Increasingly, countries like Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico and others are committing, planning, legislating, regulating and 
pricing greenhouse gas emissions to a significant degree. 
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The UK is ahead of its competitors in one aspect: its forward planning. Few other 
countries are preparing for the 2020s to the same degree as the UK is through the fourth 
carbon budget. Such longer term thinking is laudable and a deliberate feature of the 
Climate Change Act. It provides greater certainty and forward guidance for investors. Of 
course, it also makes it difficult to gauge how the UK’s targets for the 2020s will 
eventually compare with its competitors’. However, there is no indication from the past 
decade that the UK’s trading partners will not in due course adopt targets similar to ours 
for the next. The European Union in particular is already preparing to do so. Climate 
policy is not without its reversals, of course, and there can be no certainty that all other 
countries will implement their plans. This is the price of planning ahead. 
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Appendix 1 — Estimated carbon prices in selected countries 
 
Table A1. Estimated carbon prices in selected countries, £/tCO2 
 
Country OECD Vivid PC 
   Min Max 
Australia 16  28 64 
Austria 47    
Belgium 37    
Canada 6    
Chile 13    
China 0  23 37 
Czech Republic 26    
Denmark 66    
Estonia 21    
Finland 49    
France 50 54   
Germany 47 54 88 113 
Greece 55 47   
Hungary 29 36   
Iceland 62    
Ireland 63    
Israel 59    
Italy 62 63   
Japan 30  100 185 
Korea 21  145 258 
Luxembourg 76    
Mexico 2    
Netherlands 71    
New Zealand 25  5 6 
Norway 76    
Poland 21 28   
Portugal 39 58   
Slovak Republic 27    
Slovenia 55    
Spain 39 45   
Sweden 64    
Switzerland 87    
Turkey 32    
UK 59 58 48 128 
USA 4  28 32 
 
Source: OECD (2013); Vivid Economics (2012); Australia productivity Commission (APC, 2011) 
 
 
